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In

by
Lucille S. Taylor
Majority Cousel
Michigan State Senate
On

September

1,

1988,

the

Michigan

Surrogate Parenting Act1 took effect. It was not the
first such law enacted,2 but it was the most
comprehensive.
The law enunciated the public
policy of the State of Michigan with respect to
surrogate contracts and established three legal
principles addressing the critical issues raised by
the practice.
(1)STATUS OF SURROOATE CONTRACTS.
Surrogate contracts are declared to be null,
void and unenforceable in Michigan.
(2)STATUSOF COMPENSATEDSURROOACY.
Parties who enter into or arrange surrogate
contracts involving the exchange of anything
of value are subject to criminal sanctions.
The crime is a misdemeanor for parties to the
contract and a felony for persons acting as
arrangers, brokers or facilitators.
(3) STATUS OF THE CHILD
Disputes arising as to the custody of a child
born pursuant to a surrogate contract, will
be determined through a circuit court action
based on statutory principles reflecting the
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"best interest of the child,"
Michigan Child Custody Act.

found

in the

Legislative proposals to criminalize, declare
void or legalize and regulate surrogate parenting
contracts had been introduced in every session since
1983.3 The interest of a few legislators became the
concern of many as the number of surrogate births
began to increase dramatically and, though few in
number, the drama of broken contracts grabbed
national headlines. These events focused legislative,
legal and popular attention on this novel and
emotionally charged mechanism for establishing a
family.
The technique of surrogate parenting has
been known since the beginning of time. It involves
no new or modern reproductive technology.
An
absorbing
example,
with
all its attendant
ramifications,
is documented
in the biblical
narrative of Abraham, Sara and Hagar.4 However,
in the mid 1970's a dramatic change occurred that
forever altered the practice of surrogate parenting.
The exchange of substantial sums of money entered
the picture, giving a hitherto isolated occurrence
exceptional
commercial
vitality
in a demand
saturated market. The money not only compensated
the surrogate
for conceiving,
gestating
and
delivering the child; it had far more consequential
objectives.
It secured the natural mother's signed
release of parental rights. It allowed the wife of the
child's biological father to adopt the child. It enabled
the biological father and the adoptive mother to form
a family unit which thereafter legally excluded the
natural mother from any future access, care,
custody or enjoyment of that child.
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These consequences were legitimatized on the
basis of a comprehensive written contract, drawn up
by an attorney--also for a substantial fee--signed
and agreed to prior to conception.
How does a
surrogate parenting contract involving a modernday "Bob & Carol, Ted & Alice" actually work? Does
the government, through the courts, have a right to
interfere in such contracts? Does the government,
through the legislature, have a duty to intervene in
such arrangements?
What is the appropriate
governmental
response
to
contemporary,
compensated surrogate parenting agreements? The
balance of this article advances a response to those
questions
which reflects the public policy of
Michigan toward surrogacy and which is contained in
PA 199 of 1988, the Michigan Surrogate Patenting
Act.S
SURROGATEPARENTINGCCNTRACTS
Surrogate parenting can take a variety of
forms. Due to considerations of time, space, and
popular interest, this discussion of the practice, and
the legislative response to it, will be limited to the
type of arrangement which accounts for certainly
99% of the contracts and which arouses the greatest
moral, legal and ethical concerns; that is, contracts
involving compensation of a surrogate who is also
the biological mother of the child.6
The process typically begins when Carol (the
surrogate) responds to a newspaper advertisement
offering $10,000 to $15,000 to a woman who will
conceive and bear a child for another couple--Ted
and Alice. Carol is motivated by the fee as well as an
altruistic desire to help another couple have a child.
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The fee however, is the sine Qua non of her
participation.
Surrogacy is normally limited to
women who have had previous pregnancies,
resulting
in live births.
In short, 'proven
producers' who know what they are getting into.
Alice is infertile either from natural or
voluntary causes.? Ted and Alice must be persons of
considerable financial means in order to pay the
$25,000 to $30,000 total cost of the process.
Usually a face to face meeting with the surrogate
occurs, often including pictures of the surrogate's
other children, which is the basis for tentative
agreement on the part of both parties. After cursory
physical and psychological screening of Carol (but
not Ted) and an opportunity to have the documents
reviewed by her lawyer, the contract is signed and
the entire cost is paid to the attorney. Carol then
begins the artificial insemination process, often
being given fertility drugs to stimulate ovulation
and speed
conception.8
The contract deals
extensively with matters relating to the pregnancy
which, though very interesting, are not relevant to
this discussion.
After the child is born the mother is
expected, upon leaving the hospital, to surrender
physical custody of the child to the biological father
and his spouse--Ted and Alice. The surrogate's fee,
which the contract
recites
she has earned
exclusively for gestation and not for releasing her
parental rights, is nonetheless held in escrow until
the surrogate/mother also provides a signed release
and consent for adoption.
But what about Bob and the obstacle
presented by the long-standing legal presumption
that a child born to a married woman during wedlock
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is the legitimate child of her husband?9 Once the
child is born, Ted will utilize Bob's handwritten
statement indicating he did not consent Carol's
artificial
insemination,1 0 which is part of the
contract documentation, as well as the Michigan
Paternity Act11 to intitiate a circuit court action for
the purpose of setting aside these presumptions and
establishing himself as the legal father of the child.
Once the release and consent is in hand, the
baby is eligible for adoption by Alice, under the
more lenient provision states usually apply to stepparent adoptions. Ted, of course need not adopt as he
has established himself as the child's biological
father.
However, because Michigan adoption law
prohibits (as does nearly every other state, in
statutes generally labelled as prohibitions against
baby-selling) the type of payment involved in a
surrogate agreement
and, in fact, imposes a
criminal sanction for such fees,12 the final step in
the process necessary to make Alice the child's
mother and cut off Carol's right cannot occur in
Michigan.13
This cursory
exposition
of the typical
contract demonstrates how existing law, intended for
the protection of children and the preservation of
families, is either being debased or circumvented to
effect the aims of these contracts.
An examination of a standard surrogate
parenting contract discloses its commercial bases
and biases.
It was not surprising
that the
overwhelmingly
adverse
popular
reaction
to
Marybeth Whitehead's effort to reclaim her child
was met with statements like, "she's over 21" and
"she signed the contract after all." People's early
feelings about the rights of each party to the child
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were guided by general rules appropriate
to
commercial transactions.
It was only when people
began to reflect on the nature of the contract and
exactly what was being bought and sold, that
attitudes began to change, and to change rapidly.
THE ROLEOF THE COURTSIN SURROGATE
PARENTINGCONTRACTS
Even where the parties comply with the
terms of the contract, court action is necessary to
establish paternity and finalize the step-parent
adoption.
An even more vital basis for court
intervention occurs when a party decides not to
comply with the terms of the contract. The most
important issue about surrogate contracts, that is,
whether they are valid and enforceable, was settled
by the New Jersey Supreme Court Decision, In the
matter of Baby M, 109 NJ 396; 537 A2d 1227
(1988).
In addition to finding that the contract
violated that state's adoption laws, which are
similar to Michigan's with respect to compensation,
it also determined the contracts themselves to be
null, void and unenforceable for several
public
policy reasons. These included matters related to
the rearing and custody of the child, parental rights
in general and payments to the surrogate.
Because the contract was found to violate
state statute, the Court did not reach constitutional
issues raised by the parties and various amici
questioning
whether
or not the practice
of
compensated surrogacy is a fundamentally protected
right.
Proponents argue that the United States
Constitution
implicitly
protects
compensated
surrogacy as an extension of the right of privacy
existing within the word "liberty" in the Due
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Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Opponents
argue that surrogacy
is expressly
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment's abolition
of slavery and involuntary servitude.14
Michigan has two cases directly addressing
compensated surrogate parenting contracts. In Yates
v Keane, (Hearing on January 21, 1988, File Nos.
9758, 9722) the surrogate plaintiff changed her
mind about surrendering custody of the children and
brought an action in the Gratiot County Circuit Court
challenging the validity of the contract. At a hearing
on a motion for summary judgment, the court held
that surrogate parenting contracts are against
public policy and thus invalid and unenforceable
based on the fact that such contracts do nothing to
protect the fundamental
rights of children or
promote their welfare; and, the contracts belittle
the human dignity of all the parties involved.15
Michigan courts had previously addressed the
constitutional issue of a state statute prohibiting
compensation in exchange for release of parental
rights.16 In the case of Doe v Kelly, 106 Mich App
169; 307 NW2d 438 (1981),17 a surrogate was
paid $5,000 in exchange for termination of her
parental rights, enabling plaintiffs to adopt the
child. Plaintiffs' argued that Michigan Adoption Law
invaded their right to privacy established by the
United States Supreme Court in the case of Carey v
Population Services International, which held that a
couple's decision to have or not have children is a
constitutionally protected right. The Michigan Court
of Appeals upheld the validity of the Adoption Code
finding that the parties intended use of it to change
the legal status of the child was not within the
fundamental interests protected by the right to
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privacy.
THE ROLEOF THE LEGISLATUREIN SURROGATE
PARENTINGCONTRACTS
By 1987, the incentive for the Michigan
legislature to deliberate the issue of surrogate
parenting contracts was twofold. The nation's most
well known promoter of compensated surrogate
contracts, Noel Keane, had his primary business
operation in Dearborn, Michigan. This resulted in a
larger number of surrogate
births than were
occurring in other states. Not surprisingly, it also
produced more situations in which disagreements
over custody or repudiation of the contract became
an issue for Michigan courts to resolve.18 Also, in
the absence of express legislation, the prospect of
non-uniform judicial outcomes loomed large, as did
the opportunity for legislating on the part of the
courts. As publicity about surrogate cases became
more widespread, persons who were contemplating
entering into such arrangements became uneasy
about whether or not they were paying their money
or producing a child with the result being nothing
more than additional costly and controversial legal
battles.
In the face of such uncertainty, it is no
longer the choice but the duty of the legislature to
respond so that the "rules of the game" would be
clearly known to everyone.
The public policy of the State of Michigan is
unmistakable upon reviewing the contents of PA 199
of 1988.
*
As to surrogate contracts where no
compensation occurs other than payment of
reasonable and necessary medical expenses of
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pregnancy,
all contracts are "void, and
unenforceable
as contrary
to public
policy."19
If any party does not comply with
the provisions of the agreement, there is no
access to any Michigan court to enforce the
terms of the contract.
In most cases it seems the parties comply
fully with the terms of the contract.
Therefore, if
parties are willing to assume the risks associated
with noncompliance, compensated surrogacy would
remain a viable and probably
a statistically
insurable option had the law gone no further.
•• As to the contracts for which compensation
of any kind is extended to the surrogate, the
statute
makes
contracts
illegal.
A
misdemeanor penalty of up to 1 year in jail
and/or $10,000 fine is applicable to parties
to the contract.
A felony of up to 5 years
imprisonment
and/or
$50,000
fine
is
applicable to others who "induce, arrange,
procure or otherwise assist in the formation
of the contract."20
The state clearly
has no interest
in
establishing a "surrogacy police" or in sending to
jail couples who engage in this behavior out of a
desperate desire to have a family. However, because
most citizens are law-abiding, and this is no doubt
especially true of the kind of individuals who
heretofore entered into or considered surrogate
parenting, the criminalizing of this conduct sends a
clear and unequivocal message that compensated
surrogacy will not be tolerated in Michigan.
These provisions alone are insufficient to
resolve the surrogate contract issue. Despite their
stringency, children already have been born as the
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result of surrogate contracts and can still be, if the
arrangement is not for compensation. If the mother
decides not to release her parental rights, how is a
court to decide the resulting controversy?
•• As to custody disputes, the law provides that
the party with physical custody shall retain it
during pendency of the dispute and directs the
circuit court to award legal custody based on a
determination
of the "best interest of the
child."21
This statute embodies a good deal of
compromise, which is the essence of the legislative
process, especially in the custody provision.
Its
primary focus remains the child who is the
"product" of such a contract.
It declares that the
optimal societal goal is for a child to have the
opportunity to be raised, influenced and cared for by
each of its natural parents and that any choice to the
contrary should in nowise be influenced or effected
by money. This is particularly important because of
the disparate financial standing of the parties to a
surrogate
parenting
contract, the questionable
impact surrogacy has on the status of women and the
profound belief that in a just society not everything
is for sale.
Neither this philosophy nor its espousal in
the Surrogate Parenting Act is unique. Already cited
are similar provisions in the Michigan Adoption Act.
It is likewise contained in those provisions of the
Public Health Code prohibiting the sale of human
organs.22
Objections to this prohibitory statute have
been raised by women, in particular surrogates
themselves or those who wish to be surrogates, who
claim
it deprives
consenting
adults
of the
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opportunity to make and live by their choices, which
are not only valid and personal economic choices,
but the retention of which are essential to the
fundamental concepts of a democratic society.
In an ordered society there are numerous
examples of so-called "protectionist"
legislation
through which the government deprives individuals
of the ability to make choices for themselves because
of a belief that the alternative is more beneficial to
the society
as a whole.
Laws prohibiting
prostitution, certain kinds of gambling and child
labor laws, as well as minimum wage standards, are
representative examples.
None of these however
involves an innocent third party as does a surrogate
parenting contract.
THECHAU£NGETOTHESTATUTE
For a year Michigan'S Surrogate Parenting
Act has been in effect despite two challenges by the
American Civil Liberties Union on behalf of various
pseudonamed plaintiffs who are actual husbands,
wives and surrogates.
The most obvious change occurred in the
newspaper advertisements placed by Noel Keane
soliciting surrogates. Even this was only effected
after intervention by the Wayne County Prosecuting
Attorney.
Where once the $10,000 fee was
prominently displayed, now the offer is to be a
surrogate in exchange for payment of medical
expenses. A fact of life is that this law applies only
in Michigan; and, because Noel Keane operates in
several other states, as do other attorney-brokers,
it is difficult to tell whether the statute has actually
stopped surrogacy or has only stopped the formation
of contracts within the confines of the state.
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The litigation has raised more interesting
issues which this article will discuss only briefly as
they pertain to the constitutionality
and the
legislative intent of the Act. The initial case, Doe et
aJ v Attorney GeneraJ,23 was filed on September 9,
1988, requesting application
of the statute be
enjoined and a declatory judgment as to the
constitutionality
of the Act be rendered.
These
challenges were based on the Due Process and Equal
Protection clauses in both the United States and
Michigan Constitutions. As a close observer of this
litigation because of significant participation in the
formation of the statute, I found perplexing both the
course of the litigation and the opinion of the judge.
Deflecting the constitutional challenge by
suggesting an absurd construction of the statute-that the prohibition against compensated surrogacy
did not encompass gestation service contracts,24-the Attorney General obtained a stipulation from the
ACLU of the constitutionality
of the Act, if so
interpreted and applied. The matter was disposed of
on a summary judgment motion in which Judge John
Gillis determined that the constitutional question
was mooted by the ACLU stipulation. Interpretation
of the statutue was limited to a restatement of the
definition with "and" underlined and no comment
made as to the validity of compensated gestation
services contracts.
In all fairness, the plaintiffs
never raised this option. Their goal was to be able to
continue traditional surrogacy, a critical element of
which is securing the mother's release, through a
ruling that the statutory prohibition of compensated
contracts
was unconstitutional.
The case is
currently on appeal to the Michigan Court of
Appeals.
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A second case, Cae et al v Attorney General,25
was filed on March 21, 1989. This case squarely
puts before the court the question of whether or not
the parties to a contract,
by specifying
that
compensation
to the surrogate
is solely and
exclusively for gestation services and not contingent
on release of the child, can avert the prohibitions of
the statute.
This litigation is bogged down in
deciding an issue raised by the Attorney General who
argues that the very same issue was already decided
for essentially the same plaintiffs, by the same
court and is also the same issue that is on appeal to
the Court of Appeals.
While the sponsors, drafters and legislators
are confident that the statute as written is sufficient
to withstand the use of legal fictions or contrivances
created to circumvent it, a clear statement of its
intent is expressed in subsequent legislation. Senate
Bill 100 provides that even where the parties
specify that payment is exclusively for gestation
services, the law will presume it is also for release
of parental rights. This bill passed the Senate on
March 1, 1989 and awaits House action.
Any judge, lawyer or citizen who reads the
statute cannot avoid the conclusion that its intent and
effect was to absolutely ban compensated surrogacy
and strongly discourage uncompensated surrogacy.
There is an unresolved issue as to whether such a
prohibition
reinforces
or contravenes
existing
constitutional
provisions.
That is an issue for
honest debate and an appropriate legal challenge.
The current litigation frankly is not. Passage of the
Surrogate Parenting Act does not end the debate nor
does it address the underlying desire of individuals
to form families.
It does state for the record that
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within what
what the
the legislature
legislature of
of the
the State
State of
of Michigan
Michigan
within
considers aa just
just society,
society, only
only certain
certain practices
practices are
are
considers
allowed in
in pursuit
pursuit of
of those
those goals.
goals.
allowed
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1.
S.228,
introduced
by Senator
Connie
Binsfeld on April 28, 1987, became Act No. 199 of
the Public Acts of 1988 when approved by the
Governor on June 27, 1988, and is §§ 722.851 to
722.863 of the Michigan Compiled Laws.
2.
Louisiana, in 1987, as well as Indiana,
Kentucky, and Nebraska in 1988, have statutes
either banning surrogate contracts or declaring
them void.
3.
See Final Status, 1983-84 Regular Session,
82nd Legislature of the State of Michigan; 1985-86
Regular Session, 83rd Legislature of the State of
Michigan; and 1987-88 Regular Session, 84th
Legislature of the State of Michigan for bills,
sponsors, subject matter and legislative history.
4.

Genesis

16:1-15.

5.
This legislation
received
support in the Michigan legislature,
Senate with a vote of 33 to 3, and
Representatives with a vote of 90 to

overwhelming
passing in the
in the House of
10.

6.
Because no required reporting exists as to
number of contracts, number of births, number of
releases signed by mothers or number of babies
mothers refused to release, the numeric references
contained herein are based on the comments of Noel
Keane, a Michigan attorney who has arranged the
largest number of surrogate contracts.
The data
concerning contracts provisions is likewise from
surrogate contracts issued by Mr. Keane.
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7.
In the most well publicized cases, the wife of
the biological father was not infertile.
Elizabeth
Sterns of the Baby M case, is a physician, who did
not want to become pregnant for career reasons or
because of concerns about an incipient medical
problem.
In two of Michigan's most controversial
surrogacy cases, the "infertile" women had children
by prior marriages but, due to voluntary surgery,
were no longer able to bear a child.
8.
This accounts for the abnormally
high
incidence of fraternal twin births to surrogates.
9.
See Stewart y. Stewart, 91 Mich App 602,
(1979), apt. 604, "lord
Mansfield's
Rule was
judicially incorporated into Michigan law in Egbert
v Greenwalt, 44 Mich 245; 6 NW 654 (1880).
The rule was first uttered by lord Mansfield in
Goodright v Moss, 2 Cowp 591-594; 98 Eng Rep
1257-1258 (1777), which was a rule of evidence
that parties to a marriage could not testify
concerning nonaccess when the issue is paternity of
a child born during their marriage. This rule was
abolished in Michigan in Serafin v Serafin, 401
Mich 629; 258 NW2d 461 (1977), although the
Supreme Court held that a child is guarded by the
still
viable
and strong,
though
rebuttable,
presumption of legitimacy."
10.
MCl 333.2824 (6)
A child born to a
married
woman
as a result
of artificial
insemination,
with consent
of her husband
(emphasis added) is considered to be the legitimate
child of the husband.
See also MCl 700.111
regarding legitimacy
for purposes of intestate
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succession.
11 .
P .A. 1956, No. 205, as amended, being
sections 722.711 et seq. of the Michigan Compiled
laws. See especially MCl 722.711 (a) "Child born
out of wedlock" means a child ...or a child which the
court has determined to be a child born or conceived
during a marriage but not the issue of that marriage
(added by P.A. 1980, No. 54).
12.
See MCl 710.54 (1) Except for charges and
fees approved by the court, a person shall not offer,
give, or receive any money or other consideration or
thing of value in connection
with any of the
following:
(a) The placing of a child for adoption ....
(b) A release.
(c) A consent. ...
and MCl 710.69 A person who violates any of the
provisions of Sections 41 and 54 of this chapter
shall, upon conviction, be guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon subsequent conviction shall be guilty of a
felony.
13.
Florida was the forum of choice for all
surrogate adoptions. A recently enacted six month
jurisdictional
residency
requirement
has
undoubtedly affected this choice somewhat.
14.
See also 1963 Michigan Constitution, Article
I, §9 which
states:
"Neither
slavery,
nor
involuntary servitude unless for the punishment of
a crime shall ever be tolerated in this state." For a
comprehensive discussion of the applicability of the
XIII Amendment to surrogate contracts see Means,
Surrogacy v. The Thirteenth Amendment, Vol.IV
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NYlS

Human Rights Annual 445 (1987).

15.
Mi lSB
Research
Report: Surrogate
Parenting in Michigan, Vol 8, No 1 (1988).
16.

MCl 710.54 supra.

17.
Leave to appeal denied, 414 Mich 875
(1982). Certiorari denied, 459 US 1183 (1983).
18.
Though few in number, Michigan courts have
had to resolve surrogate cases presenting all of the
"imaginary horribles" that could arise from such an
arrangement.
These include a child born with
severe handicaps where the contracting couple were
divorcing.
A birth involving fraternal twins, a girl
and a boy, where the contracting couple already had
three boys and wanted only the girl, not the boy. A
case where the surrogate wished to have the contract
set aside prior to the birth and have herself delcared
the custodial parent of the subsequently born twins.
A case where a surrogate, deeply regretting her
decision, is attempting to regain parental rights to
her son by challenging the Florida adoption.
19.

MCl

722.855.

20.

MCl

722.859.

21 .
MCl 722.861. "best interest of the child"
means that term as defined in §3 of the Child Custody
Act of 1970, Act No. 91 of the Public Acts of 1970,
being §722.23 of the Michigan Compiled laws.
22.

See MCl 333.9121.
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23.
Full case name: Jane Doe, John Doe, Rena
Roe, Richard Roe, Carol Coe, Carl Coe, Paula Poe,
and Nancy Noe v Attorney General of Michigan.
American Civil Liberties Union Fund of Michigan
serving as attorneys for the Plaintiffs.
Wayne
Circuit Docket No. 88-819032-cz.
24.
The essence of the contention
is the
consequence (legislative intent) of the word and in
the statute's definition of a Surrogate Parentage
Contract as "a contract, agreement or arrangement
in which a female agrees to conceive a child through
natural or artificial insemination,
or in which a
female agrees to surrogate
gestation
and to
voluntarily relinquish her parental rights to the
child" (MCl 722.853 (i)).
25.
Full case name: Carol Coe, Carl Coe, Jane
Doe, John Doe, Tom Toe, Terri Toe and Hannah Hoe v.
Attorney General of Michigan. Plaintiffs are again
represented by the American Civil Liberties Union
Fund of Michigan. The action was again filed in the
Wayne County Circuit Court, Docket No. 89908112-cz.
This time the case was assigned to
Judge Kaye Tertzag.
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